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Abstract
We study the solution’s existence for a generalized Dynkin game of switching type which
is shown to be the natural representation for general defaultable OTC contract with con-
tingent CSA. This is a theoretical counterparty risk mitigation mechanism that allows the
counterparty of a general OTC contract to switch from zero to full/perfect collateralization
and switch back whenever she wants until contract maturity paying some switching costs
and taking into account the running costs that emerge over time. In this paper we allow
for the strategic interaction between the counterparties of the underlying contract, which
makes the problem solution much more tough. We are motivated in this research by the
importance to show the economic sense - in terms of optimal contract design - of a contin-
gent counterparty risk mitigation mechanism like our one. In particular, we show that the
existence of the solution and the game Nash equilibrium is connected with the solution of
a system of non-linear reflected BSDE which remains an open problem. We then provide
the basic ideas to numerically search the game equilibrium via an iterative optimal stopping
approach and we show the existence of the solution for our problem under strong condition,
in the so called symmetric case.
1 Introduction
1.1 Aim of the work
In this paper we analyze a theoretical contract in which counterparties want to set a contingent
CSA (credit support annex ) in order to gain the flexibility and the possibility to manage optimally
the counterparty risk. We refer specifically to a contingent risk mitigation mechanism that allows
the counterparties to switch from zero to full/perfect collateralization (or even partial) and switch
back whenever until maturity T paying some switching costs and taking into account the running
costs that emerge over time. The running costs that we model and consider in the analysis of
this problem are - by one side - those related to CVA namely counterparty risk hedging costs and
- by the other side - the collateral and funding/liquidity costs that emerge when collateralization
is active.
We can summarize the characteristics and the basic idea underlying the problem - that we show
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to admit a natural formulation as a stochastic differential game of switching type - through the
so defined contingent CSA scheme shown below (Fig. 1.1), in which - by considering also the
funding issue in the picture - is present a third party, an external funder assumed default free
(λ = 0) in order to reduce dimension and technical issues.
Here, motivated by the results obtained in the unilateral case2, we analyze the problem in a
generalized setting allowing for the strategic interplay between the parties of the contingent CSA
scheme.
This has lead us to study the solution’s existence and the equilibrium for the stochastic differential
game of switching type that we are going to define in section two. We can anticipate that our
game solution (its existence and uniqueness) remains an open problem, that deserves further
studies and research. We also highlight the basic ideas of the game’s numerical solution via
iterative optimal stopping approach. Then further analysis on game equilibrium are taken over
in section three and some model applications in section four.
1.2 Literature review
The body of literature regarding stochastic differential games theory is very wide. The roots of
the theory are founded in the pioneering works of von Neumann (1944) - for (mainly cooperative)
zero sum game - and Nash (1950) - for (non cooperative) non-zero sum game - and the work of
Isaacs (see Isaacs (2000)) who studied for first the differential games in a deterministic setting.
In the stochastic framework it is worth of mention the seminal work of Eugene Dynkin (Dynkin
(1967)) who firstly analyzed stochastic differential games where the agent control set is given by
stopping times, so that these ”games on stopping” are known as Dynkin games in his honor.
Certainly, it is impossible to mention here all the numerous important contribution in this field
of research and to give a systematic account of the theory and of the literature. For a complete
treatment of the different type of games we refer to the book of Isaacs on differential games. So
we give in the following just a simplified classification restricting ourselves to the literature more
2We refer to the stochastic optimal control formulation highlighted in the third section of Mottola (2013)
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related to our stochastic switching control problem.
This classification is based on the following main categories:
a)game and equilibrium type: it includes zero and non-zero-sum games whose solution can be
searched mainly in terms of cooperative or non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium. This depends
also on the characteristics of the game which are mainly the system dynamic - that can be
markovian/non markovian - and controls which can be state controls, stopping controls (as in
Dynkin games) or both which are called mixed control and stopping. Also the number of player
is relevant, here we focus on the case p = 2.
b) solution approaches: these are mainly the analytical approach that allows - typically under
a markovian framework - to formulate the stochastic differential game (SDG) as a system of
(second order) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations or variational inequalities to solve, proving
existence and (possibly) uniqueness of the solution, namely of the equilibrium of the game. The
main solution techniques are the ones related to PDE theory, the dynamic programming principle
and viscosity solution.
Worth of mention, from the analytical point of view, are the important works of Bensoussan and
Friedman (1977) that for first showed the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a non-zero-sum
SDG with stopping {τ1, τ2} as controls, formulating the problem as a system of quasi-variational
inequalities (solved through fixed point methods), assuming continuous and bounded running re-
wards and terminal rewards; instead Fleming and Souganidis (1989) for first showed the existence
and uniqueness of the solution/equilibrium for zero-sum SDG through dynamic programming and
viscosity solution approach. These techniques have become very popular and used in the recent
literature given the deep connection with probabilistic tools, as we have already mentioned in
chapter five.
In fact, the probabilistic approach is the other more general one3 that makes use of the martin-
gale (also via duality methods) and Snell envelope theory and, in addition, of the deep results
of the forward-backward SDE theory in order to derive existence and uniqueness of the optimal
control/stopping strategy for the game.
The main works worth of mention - other that the already mentioned work of Cvitanic and
Karatzas (1996) that for first highlights the connection between the solution of zero-sum Dynkin
game and that of doubly reflected BSDE (other than its analytical solution) - are that of:
Hamadene (1998) that shows how the solution of a SDG is related to that of a backward-
forward SDE; Hamadene and Lepeltier (2000) that extend the analysis through reflected BSDE
to ”mixed game” problems; El Karoui and Hamadene (2003) that generalize the existence and
uniqueness results for zero and non-zero-sum game with ”risk sensitive” controls; Hamadene and
Zhang (2008) that use Snell envelope technique to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium for
non-zero-sum Dynkin game in a non-markovian framework and Hamadene and Zhang (2010)
that tackle the solution of a general switching control problem via systems of interconnected
(nonlinear) RBSDE (with oblique reflection).
To conclude the section we recall also the monographic work of Pham (2009) and Yong and
Zhu (1999) for a clear and detailed analysis of backward SDE and we remark also that much of
these literature and works have been inspired by financial valuation problems. We refer mainly to
the american game option problem as defined in Kifer (2000) (also known as israeli option). This
has given impulse to the literature related mainly to convertible and switchable bond valuation
whose solution can be related to that of a zero-sum Dynkin game.
3In fact, it allows to deal also with general non markovian dynamics for the system state variables.
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1.3 Some examples od Dynkin games
Let us briefly remind that stochastic differential games are a family of dynamic, continuous
time versions of differential games (as defined by Isaacs) incorporating randomness in both the
states and the rewards. The random states are described typically by adapted diffusion processes
whose dynamics are known (or assumed). To play a game, a player receives a running reward
cumulated at some rate till the end of the game and a terminal reward granted at the end of
the game. The rewards are related to both the state process and the controls at the choice of
the players, as deterministic or random functions or functionals of them. A control represents
a player action in attempt to influence his rewards. Assuming his rationality, a player acts in
the most profitable way based on his knowledge represented by his information filtration. Before
starting the formulation and the analysis of our generalized Dynkin game of switching type, let us
recall - in a markovian framework - some example for both a non-zero-sum and zero-sum Dynkin
game (with p = 2) and the relative equilibrium characterization. For all the details we refer in
particular to the works of Bensoussan and Friedman (1977) and Fleming and Souganidis (1989)
-Non-zero-sum Dynkin game: Given a standard probability space represented by the triple
(Ω,F ,P) where we defineW = (Wt)0≤t≤T be a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion adapted
to the space filtration. Assuming as true the usual conditions on the drift function µ(.) and
volatility function σ(.), such that the following SDE admits a unique solution
dy(t) = µ(y(t), t)dt+ σ(y(t), t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]
y(0) = y0.
Let (for p = 1, 2) fp(y, t) the running reward function and φp(y, t), ψp(y, t) the reward function
obtained by the players upon stopping the game be continuous and bounded in Rd × [0, T ], with
fp ∈ L2 square integrable and ψp ≤ φp for all (y, t) ∈ Rd× [0, T ]. Then let gp(y(T )) the terminal
reward function also continuous and bounded.
In a game of this kind, the two players have to decide optimally when to stop the game finding
the optimal control given by the stopping times (τ1, τ2) that give the maximum expected reward.
So let us set the payoff functional for the two players of this Dynkin game as follows
Jp(y, τ1, τ2) = E
[ ∫ τ1∧τ2∧T
t
fp(y(s), s)ds+ 1{τi<τj}φp(y(τi), τi)
+ 1{τi≥τj ,T>τj}ψp(y(τj), τj) + 1{τ1=τ2=T}gp(y(T ))
]
for j 6= i( ∈ {1, 2}),
and for (t ≤ τi ≤ T ). Being in a non-zero-sum game with the players that aims to maximize their
payoff Jp(.) without cooperation, the problem here is to find a Nash equilibrium point (NEP)
for the game, that is to determine the couple of optimal stopping times (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) such that
J1(y, τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≥ J2(y, τ1, τ∗2 ), ∀ τ1, τ2 ∈ [t, T ]
J2(y, τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≥ J1(y, τ∗1 , τ2), ∀ τ1, τ2 ∈ [t, T ]
namely the supremum of the payoff functional over the stopping time set. In other words, the
NEP implies that every player has no incentive to change his strategy given that the other one
has already defined optimally his strategy.
This type of game, as shown in Bensoussan and Friedman (1977), has an analytical represen-
tation given by a system of variational inequalities but it admits also a stochastic counterpart
through system of BSDE with reflecting barrier. We return to its formal definition in the next
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section in relation to our problem. The Nash equilibrium defined above can be fairly generalized
in the case of mixed game of control and stopping. We show this below in relation to zero-sum
games.
- Zero-sum mixed game: A zero-sum game is characterized by the antagonistic interaction
of the players that in this case has the same payoff functional but their objective are different
because for one player the payoff is a reward (let’s think typically at the buyer of a convertible
bond) that he wants to maximize, while for the other one is a cost that he intends to minimize.
In the generalized case of mixed games of control and stopping, the set of control will be enriched
by the Ft-progressively measurable process (αt)t≤T and (βt)t≤T that are the intervention function
namely the state controls respectively for the player p1 and p2. In addition, the players have
to decide optimally when to stop the game setting the stopping times τ (for p1) and σ (for p2).
Indeed, the system dynamic being controlled by the agents can be expressed as the following
controlled diffusion (remaining in a markovian framework):
dy(t)α,β = µ(t, yα,βt , αt, βt)dt+ η(t, y
α,β
t , αt, βt)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]
y(0)α,β = y0.
The zero-sum game payoff being the same for both the players will be
Γ(α, τ ;β, σ) := E
[ ∫ T∧τ∧σ
t
f(s, yα,βs , αs, βs)ds+ 1{τ≤σ<T}φ(τ, y
α,β
τ )
+ 1{σ<τ}ψ(σ, yα,βσ ) + 1{τ=σ=T}g(y
α,σ(T ))
]
(t ≤ τ ≤ σ < T )
where the running and reward functions are intended to be the same as in the non-zero-sum case
but clearly now they are the same for both players.
The solution of this SDG is typically tackled by studying the upper and lower value function of
the players, which are
U(t, y) := sup
α
inf
β
sup
τ
inf
σ
Γ(α, τ ;β, σ) (upper value p1)
L(t, y) := inf
β
sup
α
inf
σ
sup
τ
Γ(α, τ ;β, σ) (lower value p2)
Under some standard condition on the reward function and on controls, the problem has been
tackled analytically representing the lower and upper value of the game as a system of nonlinear
PDE with two obstacles/barriers, defined as followsmin
{
u(t, y)− φ(t, y),max
{
∂u
∂t (t, y)−H−(t, y, u,Du,D2u), u(t, y)− ψ(t, y)
}}
= 0
u(T, y) = g(y),min
{
v(t, y)− φ(t, y),max
{
∂v
∂t (t, y)−H+(t, y, v,Dv,D2v), v(t, y)− ψ(t, y)
}}
= 0
v(T, y) = g(y),
where H+(.) and H−(.) are the hamiltonian operators (as defined in chapter four) associated
to the upper and lower value function of the SDG. To solve the system, the unknown solution
function u and v can be shown (under some techinical assumptions) to be viscosity solutions of
the above two PDE with obstacles and to coincide with the value functions U(t, y) and L(t, y)
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of the game.
In particular, when the Isaacs condition holds, namely
H−(t, y, u, q,X) = H+(t, y, u, q,X)
then the two solutions coincide and the SDG has a value namely
V := sup
α
inf
β
sup
τ
inf
σ
Γ(α, τ ;β, σ) = inf
β
sup
α
inf
σ
sup
τ
Γ(α, τ ;β, σ)
which is called the saddle point equilibrium of the mixed zero-sum game.
We mention also that in this case, as in the non-zero-sum case, the SDG has a stochastic rep-
resentation which is expressed in terms of a doubly reflected BSDE (2RBSDE)4. In particular,
setting the terminal reward ξ, the early exercise rewards φt = Ut and ψt = Lt which represent
the two barriers of the value process, therefore the generator function f , the value process Yt,
Zt which is the conditional expectation/volatility process that helps Yt to be Ft-measurable and
K the compensator process, it can be shown that the following 2RSBDE5 solution
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
f(s, Ys, Zs) + (K
+
T −K+t )− (K−T −K−t )−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs ∀t ≤ T
Lt ≤ Yt ≤ Ut, ∀t ≤ T,∫ T
0
(Ys − Ls)dK+s =
∫ T
0
(Us − Ys)dK−s = 0
2 Defaultable Dynkin game of switching type
2.1 Framework and assumptions
To begin is convenient to describe the framework in which we work and to give the main defini-
tions of the processes and variables involved. The framework setting follows strictly the reduced-
form models literature and we refer to the classical monograph of Bielecki and Rutkowski (2004)
for details.
Let us consider a probability space described by the triple (Ω,Gt,P) where the full filtration is
given by Gt = σ(Ft ∨ HA ∨ HB)t≥0 for t ∈ [0, T ] and P the real probability measure defined on
this space. On it lie two strictly positive random time τi for i ∈ {A,B}, which represent the
default times of the counterparties considered in our model. In addition, we define the default
process Hit = 1{τ i≤t} and the relative filtration Hi generated by Hit for any t ∈ R+. We are left
to mention F which is the (risk-free) market filtration generated by a d-dimensional Brownian
motion vector W adapted to it, under the real measure P. In addition, we remember that all
the processes we consider, in particular Hi, are ca´dla´g semimartingales G adapted and τ i are G
stopping times.
For convenience, let us define the first default time of the counterparties as τ = τA ∧ τB which
also represent the ending/exstinction time of the underlying contract, with the corresponding
indicator process Ht = 1{τ≤t}.As concerns the underlying market model it is assumed arbitrage-
free, namely it admits a spot martingale measure Q (not necessarily unique) equivalent to P. A
4Its connection with the analytical representation and viscosity solution of PDE with obstacles, as already
mentioned, has been established in the work of Cvitanic and Karatzas (1996).
5This is established in the work of Cvitanic and Karatzas (1996).
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spot martingale measure is associated with the choice of the savings account Bt (so that B
−1 as
discount factor) as a numeraire that, as usual, is given by Ft-predictable process
Bt = exp
∫ t
0
rsds, ∀ t ∈ R+ (1)
where the short-term r is assumed to follow an F-progressively measurable stochastic process
(whatever it is the choice of the term structure model for itself).
We then define the Aze´ma supermartingale Gt = P(τ > t|Ft) with G0 = 1 and Gt > 0 ∀ t ∈ R+
as the survival process of the default time τ with respect to the filtration F. The process G
being a bounded G-supermartingale it admits a unique Doob-Meyer decomposition G = µ − ν,
where µ is the martingale part and ν is a predictable increasing process. In particular, ν is
assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, so that dνt = υtdt
for some F-progressively measurable, non-negative process υ. So that, we can define now the
default intensity λ as the F-progressively measurable process that is set as λt = G−1t υt so that
dGt = dµt − λtGtdt and the cumulative default intensity is defined as follows
Λt =
∫ t
0
G−1u dνu =
∫ t
0
λudu, (2)
For convenience, we assume that the immersion property holds in our framework, so that every
ca´dla´g G-adapted (square-integrable) martingale is also F-adapted.
In particular, we assume pre-default valued processes namely, setting J := 1 − H = 1{t≤τ}
we have that for any G-adapted, respectively G-predictable process X over [0, T ], there exists a
unique F-adapted, respectively F-predictable, process X˜ over [0, T ], called the pre-default value
process of X, such that JX = JX˜, respectively J−X = J−X˜.
As regards counterparty objectives, {A,B} are both defaultable and are assumed to behave
rationally with the same objective to minimize the overall costs related to counterparty risk -
quantified through the BCVA - and those related to collateral and funding. The information
flow is assumed symmetric.
2.2 Main definitions: BCVA, contingent CSA and funding
Let us state the main definitions that are needed to model our claim with contingent CSA. Also
here we just state the objects involved, for proofs and details we refer to the already mentioned
work and the reference therein.
1) BCVA definition. Following Bielecki et al. (2011) (proposition 2.9), the bilateral CVA
process of a defaultable claim with bilateral counterparty risk (X; A;Z; τ) maturing in T satisfies
the following relation6
BCV At = S
rf
t − St (3)
= CV At −DV At
= BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τ=τB≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RBc )(Srfτ )−
∣∣∣∣Gt]+
− BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τ=τA≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RAc )(Srfτ )+
∣∣∣∣Gt] (4)
6The formulation is seen from the point of view of B. Being symmetrical between the party, just the signs
change.
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for every t ∈ [0, T ], where Bt indicates the discount factor,Ric for i ∈ {A,B} is the counterparty
recovery rate (process) and where the clean price process Srft would be simply represented by the
integral over time of the contract dividend flow under the relative martingale pricing measure Q,
that is
Srft = BtEQ
(∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dD
rf
u
∣∣Ft) t ∈ [0, T ] (5)
and Drft is the clean dividend process of the default-free contract
Drft = X(T ) +
∑
i∈{A,B}
(∫
]t,T ]
dAiu
)
t ∈ [0, T ] (6)
where X is the F-adapted final payoff, A the F-adapted process representing the contract’s
promised dividends and τ = τ i = ∞. We are left to state the definitions of (bilateral) risky
dividend and price process of a general defaultable claim:
Dt = X1{T<τ} +
∑
i∈{A,B}
(∫
]t,T ]
(1−Hiu)dAiu +
∫
]t,T ]
ZudH
i
u
)
t ∈ [0, T ] (7)
for i ∈ {A,B} and
NPVt = St = BtEQ
(∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣Gt) t ∈ [0, T ]. (8)
where Z is the recovery process that specifies the recovery payoff at default and Ht := 1{τ≤t}
the already defined default process.
2) Collateral definition with contingent CSA. In order to generalize collateralization in
presence of contingence CSA, we recall the definition collateral account/process Collt : [0, T ]→ R
is a stochastic Ft-adapted process defined as
Collt = 1{Srft >ΓB+MTA}(S
rf
t − ΓB) + 1{Srft <ΓA−MTA}(S
rf
t − ΓA), (9)
on the time set {t < τ}, and
Collt = 1{Srf
τ−>ΓB+MTA}
(Srfτ− − ΓB) + 1{Srf
τ−<ΓA−MTA}
(Srfτ− − ΓA), (10)
on the set {τ ≤ t < τ+∆t}, thresholds Γi, for i ∈ {A,B} and positive minimum transfer amount
MTA.
The perfect collateralization case, say CollPerft , can be shown to be always equal to the mark to
market, namely to the (default free) price process Srft of the underlying claim, that is formally
CollPerft = 1{Srft >0}(S
rf
t − 0) + 1{Srft <0}(S
rf
t − 0) = Srft ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], on {t < τ}. (11)
and
CollPerft = S
rf
τ− ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], on {τ ≤ t < τ + ∆t}. (12)
Let us remind that in presence of perfect/full collateralization one can easily show that
BCV AColl
Perf
t = S
rf
t − St = 0 =⇒
St = S
rf
t ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (13)
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Generalizing, the contingent collateral CollCt can be defined as the Ft-adapted process defined
for any time t ∈ [0, T ] and for every switching time τj ∈ [0;T ] and j = 1, . . . ,M , switching
indicator zjand default time τ (defined above as min{τA, τB}), which is formally
CollCt = S
rf
t 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + 01{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1} on {t < τ} (14)
on the set {t < τ}, and
CollCt = S
rf
τ−1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + 01{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1}
on the set {τ ≤ t < τ + ∆t}.
2) BCVA definition with contingent CSA. By the definition of DCt and S
C
t as the
dividend and price process in presence of the contingent CSA
DCt = D
rf
t 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} +Dt1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1} (15)
SCt = S
rf
t 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + St1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1} (16)
for any time t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ], switching times τj ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ], j = 1, . . . ,M and switching indicator
zj ∈ {0, 1}, we define the bilateral CVA of a contract with contingent CSA of switching type as
follows
BCV ACt = S
rf
t − SCt
= Srft − (Srft 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + St1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1})
= 01{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} +BCV At1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1}. (17)
where the expression for BCV At is known from the former point.
4) Funding definition. As regards funding, in our setting we allow for difference in the
funding rates between counterparties. In particular, we assume the existence of the following
funding asset Bopp
i
t , B
borri
t and B
remi
t In particular, under the assumptions of segregation (no
collateral rehypotecation), collateral made up by cash and BCVA not funded7, let us highlight
that if counterparty i ∈ {A,B} has to post collateral in the margin account, she sustains a
funding cost, applied by the external funder, represented by the borrowing rate rborr
i
t = rt + s
i
t
that is the risk free rate plus a credit spread (that is usually different from the other party) . By
the other side, the counterparty receives by the funder the remuneration on the collateral post,
that we define in the CSA as a risk free rate plus some basis points, namely is rrem
i
t = rt + bp
i
t.
Hence we assume the following dynamics for the funding assets (which can be different between
counterparties)
dBborr
i
t = (rt + s
i
t)B
borri
t dt, i ∈ {A,B} (18)
dBrem
i
t = (rt + bp
i
t)B
remi
t dt, i ∈ {A,B} (19)
Instead, considering the counterparty that call the collateral, as above the collateral is remuner-
ated at the rate given (as the remuneration for the two parties can be different) by Brem, but she
cannot use or invest the collateral amount (that is segregated), so she sustains an opportunity
cost, that can be represented by the rate ropp
i
t = rt + pi
i
t where pi is a premium over the risk free
rate. Hence, we assume the existence of the following asset too
dBopp
i
t = (rt + pi
i
t)B
borri
t dt, i ∈ {A,B} (20)
7This assumption is relevant in order to simplify the problem formulation and to deal with its recursive nature.
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To conclude the section, let us underline that given the symmetrical nature of processes
(except for the funding ones) the following relations states:
BCV AAt = −BCV ABt t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ]
BCV AC
A
t = −BCV AC
B
t t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ]
CollC
A
t = −CollC
B
t t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ].
2.3 Model dynamics, controls and cost functionals
In our contingent CSA model of multiple switching type (with finite horizon), both counterparties
A,B are free to switch from zero to perfect collateralization every time in [0, T ]. Hence their
control sets are made up by sequences of switching times - say τj ∈ T - and switching indicators
zj ∈ Z with T ⊂ [0, T ], that we define formally as follows
CA = {T A,ZA} = {τAj , zAj }Mj=1, ∀τAj ∈ [0, T ], zAj ∈ {0, 1} (21)
CB = {T B ,ZB} = {τBj , zBj }Mj=1, ∀τBj ∈ [0, T ], zBj ∈ {0, 1} (22)
with the last switching {τMi ≤ T} (M < ∞). We recall that τ ij are by definitions of stopping
times Ft-measurable random variables, while zij are Fτj -measurable switching indicators, taking
values in our model ∀ ∈ 1 . . . ,M{
zj = 1⇒ zero collateral (full CV A)
zj = 0⇒ full collateral (null CV A)
Clearly controls affect also our model dynamic. As regards this point, we assume general marko-
vian diffusions for (X;λi) i ∈ {A,B}, namely the interest rates and the default intensities of
counterparties. From the definitions of contingent CSA and (bilateral) CVA given in the last
section, we highlight that the switching controls enter and affect the dynamic of these pro-
cesses. In fact, as we know, switching to full collateralization implies BCV A = 0, that is
St = S
rf
t = Coll
perf
t . This means no counterparty risk and so the default intensities’ dynamic
dλit won’t be relevant, just dX will be considered while z = 0 ( namely until the collateralization
will be kept active). So, formally, we have:
if
{
zj = 1
}
and {τj ≤ t < τj+1} ⇒
DCt = Dt ⇒
SCt = St ⇒
BCV ACt = BCV At∀ t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ]
so that the relevant dynamic to model the BCVA process in this regime is
dXt = µ(t,Xt)X(t)dt+ σ(t,Xt)X(t)dW
x
t ; X(0) = x0
dλAt = γ(t, λ
A
t )λ
A(t)dt+ ν(t, λAt )λ
A(t)dWλ
A
t ; λ
A(0) = λA0
dλBt = χ(t, λ
B
t )λ
B(t)dt+ η(t, λBt )λ
B(t)dWλ
B
t ; λ
B(0) = λB0
d〈X,λAt 〉t = d〈W xt ,Wλ
A
t 〉t = ρX,λAdt
d〈X,λBt 〉t = d〈W xt ,Wλ
B
t 〉t = ρX,λBdt
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if
{
zj = 0
}
and {τj ≤ t < τj+1} ⇒
DCt = D
rf
t ⇒
SCt = S
rf
t = Coll
Perf
t ⇒
BCV ACt = 0∀ t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ]
so that the relevant dynamic to model the process in this regime will be just
dXt = µ(t,Xt)X(t)dt+ σ(t,Xt)X(t)dW
x
t ; X(0) = x0.
Here, the drift and volatility coefficient µ(t, x), σ(t, x), γ(t, x), ν(t, x), χ(t, x) and η(t, x) are all
continuous, measurable and real valued function F-adapted to the relative brownian filtration.
For a matter of convenience we ease the notation by setting our system dynamic in vectorial form;
dY(t) :=

dt
dXt
dλit
dZi
, Y(0) =

t = 0
x0
λi0
Zi0 = 1

for i ∈ {A,B}.
As regards counterparties cost functionals’ formulation, we remind that both are assumed
coherently8 counterparty risk averse, but in this case they can have different preference/cost
functions in which they need to take in account also the optimal control strategy of the other
party, namely its response function b−i(ui) where ui := Ci and i ∈ {A,B}. We are going to
discuss more about it in the next section on game formulation. Here, let us be more explicit
about the formulation of counterparties costs for which we assume - for convenience - quadratic
preferences for both generalized to take in account the optimal control strategy of the other party
over time t ∈ [0; τ ∧ T ], that is formally9:
a) Running costs:
FA(Yt, bB(uA), t) =

[
(CV AA(s)−DV AA(s))− δB(s, u∗,A)]2 if{zij = 1}(( ∫ T∧τAj+1
u
RA(s)[NPV A(v)]du−NPV A(s))− δB(s, u∗,A))2 if {zij = 0}.
∀ s, τj ∈ [t, T ∧ τ ] and for counterparty B
FB(Yt, bA(uB), t) =

[
(CV AB(s)−DV AB(s))− δA(s, u∗,B)]2 if{zij = 1}(( ∫ T∧τBj+1
u
RB(s)[NPV B(v)]du−NPV B(s))− δA(s, u∗,B))2 if {zij = 0}.
∀ s, τj ∈ [t, T ∧ τ ] and i ∈ {A,B}. Here, all the terms of the running costs are known except
the response function δ(.)i which is assumed non-negative, continuous and F-adapted and the
funding factor term Ri(s) which we set to model the expected collateral and funding costs when
zj = 0, that is formally
8Otherwise, it would not have sense for both to sign a contract wich give flexibility to activate collateralization
whenever is optimal.
9For further details let us refer to section three of Mottola (2013).
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Ri(t) =
{
− exp−(riborr − rirem)t if zj = 0 and NPV < 0
exp−(riopp − rirem)t if zj = 0 and NPV > 0.
b) Terminal costs
GA(Yt, bB(uA), t) =
{
(−NPV A(T )− δB(T, u∗,A))2 ⇒ if collateral is active
(0− δB(T, u∗,A))2 ⇒ no collateral
GB(Yt, bA(uB), t) =
{
(−NPV B(T )− δA(T, u∗,B))2 ⇒ if collateral is active
(0− δA(T, u∗,B))2 ⇒ no collateral.
c) Instantaneous switching costs:
li
(
τ ij , z
i
j
)
=
M∑
j≥1
e−rτ
i
j czij (t)1{τ ij∧τ−ij <T}, ∀ τ
i
j , z
i
j ∈ {T i,Zi},
for i ∈ {A,B}, where ci(.) is the F-predictable (deterministic for convenience) instantaneous
cost function.
2.4 Game formulation and pure strategies definition
In this section we pass to give a generalized formulation for our contingent CSA scheme in which
allowing for the strategic interaction between the players - which are the counterparties of this
theoretical contract - we are lead to formulate our problem as a stochastic differential game
whose study of the equilibrium is central for the existence of a solution and the optimal design
of our contingent scheme.
In order to formulate the game, firstly, we recall that in our model for the contingent CSA
scheme we assume no fixed times or other rules for switching, that is the counterparty can switch
optimally every time until contract maturity T in order to minimize its objective functional. But
the functionals, as set formally in the former section, now are generalized and not symmetrical
between the parties : as already mentioned, both players are assumed to remain risk averse
to the variance of bilateral CVA, collateral and funding costs, but depending on the different
parametrization of the functionals (that we show below) and instantaneous switching costs other
than the difference in default intensities, the problem can be naturally represented by a gener-
alized non-zero-sum Dynkin game. This is a non-zero-sum game given that the player payoff
functionals are not symmetrical and generalized in the sense that player controls are not just
simple stopping times but sequences of random times that define the optimal times to switch τj
from a regime to the other (together with switching indicators sequences zj ).
Therefore, given that the right to switch is bilateral and we assume no other rules/constraint on
controls set by contract, the other player’s optimal strategy - and hence the strategic interaction
with the other party - becomes central to define the own optimal switching strategy. Let us
be more formal and, building on the definitions of section 2.3, we define our model’s SDG as a
generalized Dynkin game of switching type as follows.
Definition 2.4.1 (Dynkin game of switching type definition).Let us consider two play-
ers/counterparties {A,B} that have signed a general contract with a contingent CSA of switching
type. Given the respective payoff functionals F i(.) (or running reward), the terminal rewards
Gi(.) and the instantaneous switching cost functions li(.) where i ∈ {A,B}, under rationality
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assumption and non-cooperative strategic interaction, the players aim to minimize the following
objective functional:
J i(y, ui, u−i) = inf
ui∈{Ciad}
E
[∑
j
∫ τ ij∧τ−ij ∧T
t
Bs
[
F i(ys, u
i, b−i(ui))
]
ds (23)
+ li
(
τ ij , z
i
j
)
+Gi(yT , b
−i(ui))
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
for i ∈ {A,B}
where we mean for i = A then −i = B and viceversa, Bt is defined in (1), the system dynamic
is defined in section 2.3 by dyt := dYt, the controls set are defined in (21)-(22) and we have set
for notational convenience ui := {T i,Zi} for i ∈ {A,B}.
Let us underline from definition 2.4.1 that the payoffs functions, whose specific formulation
has been stated in section 2.3, can differ between A and B for the following terms
δA(.) Q δB(.) (24)
RAt (.) Q RBt (.) (25)
cAt (.) Q cBt (.) (26)
where
a) Ri(.) is the funding-collateral cost factor defined in the former section;
b) δi(.) is the running cost function threshold which is generalized her taking as argument the
optimal response and control strategies of the other player;
c) cit(.) are the already known instantaneous costs from switching.
Remarks 2.4.2. The game as formulated above in (23) is fairly general; in addition, one
could also introduce the possibility for the players to stop the game adding a stopping time
(and the related reward/cost function) to the set of controls made up of switching times and
indicators. From the financial point of view, this can be justified by a early termination clause
set in the contingent CSA defined by the parties. Anyway, given the problem recursion, this
would add greater complications that we leave for further research.
Actually this game is already complicated by the fact that, differently from the (non-zero-sum)
Dynkin game as formulated in section 1.3, here the players control strategies affect also each
other payoffs. In fact, given that in our general formulation the players can switch optimally
whenever over the life of the underlying contract, it is clear that - without setting any other rules
for the game - the decision of one player to switch to a certain regime impose a different cost
function FZ(.)
i also for the other player. So if A switches but for B the decision is not optimal,
he is able to immediately switch back, taking in account the instantaneous switching costs10.
In this sense, the relative difference between players’ payoff (in the different regimes) and the
strategic interaction between them over time become central in order to understand and analyze
the problem solution/equilibrium.
We return on this points later, here is important to mention that in order to highlight this
strategic dependence in the game - that is assumed to be played by rational and non-cooperative
players - we have enriched the running cost function FZ(.)
i by a response function b−i(ui), which
10Note from (23) that the indicator 1{τAj ∧τBj <T} the instantaneous switching costs enter in the functional
whoever of the players decides to switch
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can be intended mainly in two way:
a) as the ”classical” best response function to the other player strategy, which implies the
complete information assumption in the game, that is the players have the same information set
about the system dynamic and they are able to calculate (under the real probability measure P)
each other payoff;
b) if the game information is not complete and there is a degree of uncertainty over the
players payoff and their switching strategy, the function b−i(ui) can be intended in generalized
terms as a probability distribution assigned by a player to the optimal response of the other one.
We discuss further on the game information flows below. Now, the main issue to tackle is
to understand the condition under which this generalized game (23) have sense and it will be
played, which means that it will be signed by counterparties. This takes to the problem definition
of an equilibrium for this game and to the condition under which its existence and uniqueness
are ensured.
Before giving the formal definition of the game equilibrium, let us highlight the game pure strate-
gies at a given time {τ ij−1 < t ≤ τ ij} under the assumption of simultaneous moves by players.
Definition 2.4.3 (Pure strategies of the game of switching type). For any given
initial condition zA0 , z
B
0 and ∀ zAj ∈ uA and zBj ∈ uB and {τ ij−1 < t ≤ τ ij}, the pure strategies of
our Dynkin game of switching type are defined as follows
if{zj−1 = 0} =⇒
{zAj = 0, zBj = 0} =⇒ ”no switch”
{zAj = 0, zBj = 1} =⇒ ”switch to 1”
{zAj = 1, zBj = 0} =⇒ ”switch to 1”
{zAj = 1, zBj = 1} =⇒ ”switch to 1”.
while if {zj−1 = 1} =⇒
{zAj = 0, zBj = 0} =⇒ ”switch to 0”
{zAj = 0, zBj = 1} =⇒ ”switch to 0”
{zAj = 1, zBj = 0} =⇒ ”switch to 0”
{zAj = 1, zBj = 1} =⇒ ”no switch”.
In the table below we represent the standard game form at a given decision time with the pos-
sible (pure) strategies (namely the switching indicators) and the related random payoff between
parenthesis.
A,B Switch No Switch
Switch 1, 1 (JA, JB) 1, 0 (JA, JB)
No Switch 0, 1 (JA, JB) 0, 0 (JA, JB)
where we note that the players’ strategies can be cast in these two categories:
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1. on the main diagonal of the table we have accomodation/peace type switching strategies
played over time;
2. on the opposite diagonal of the table we have fighting/war type switching strategies played
over time.
2.5 Game equilibrium and stochastic representation through system
of RBSDE
From a static point of view the NEP for the game of definition 2.4.1 can be easily found once the
payoff J i are known. But the problem is that game configurations like these has to be played
over time taking in account as key factors:
1. the payoff value that derives from switching at a given time;
2. the expected value from waiting until the next switching time;
3. the optimal responses, namely the other party optimal switching strategy. This implies -
by information flows’ symmetry - that each player knows how to calculate (under the real
probability measure P) the points a) and b) relative to the other party.
The resulting equilibrium is an optimal sequence of switching over time for both players that
needs a (backward) dynamically recursive valuation. On an heuristic base, we expect that if
the relative difference (over time) in players payoff functionals - mainly due to different function
parametrization, default intensities λi or switching costs ciZ - remains low, it is more likely that
the switching strategies on the main diagonal of the game {1, 1; 0, 0} will be played (given that
both players would have also similar best responses). This should ease the search for the equilib-
rium of the game but this makes more likely to incur in banal solutions . Otherwise, one should
observe a more complicated strategic behavior that needs a careful study depending also on the
type of equilibrium that now we try to define.
Indeed, given the characteristics of our game namely a non-zero-sum game in which the agents
are assumed rational and act in a non-cooperative way in order to minimize their objective func-
tion knowing that also the other part will do the same, the equilibrium/solution of this type of
games is the celebrated Nash equilibrium point (NEP). Actually, - as already shown - in our case
the equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of optimal switching over time and being game
(23) a generalization of a Dynkin game, by similarity, we can state the following definition of a
Nash equilibrium point for a Dynkin game of switching type.
Definition 2.5.1 (NEP for Dynkin game of switching type). Let us define the switching
control sets for the player {A,B} of the generalized Dynkin game (23) as follows
uA :=
{
τAj , z
A
j
}M
j=1
, ∀ τAj ∈ [0, T ], zAj ∈ {0, 1};
uB :=
{
τBj , z
B
j
}M
j=1
, ∀ τBj ∈ [0, T ], zBj ∈ {0, 1}.
A Nash equilibrium point for this game is given by the pair of sequences of switching times and
indicators {u∗A, u∗B} such that for any control sequences {uA, uB} the following condition are
satisfied
JA(y;u∗A, u
∗
B) ≤ JA(y;uA, u∗B) (27)
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and
JB(y;u∗A, u
∗
B) ≤ JB(y;u∗A, uB) (28)
(the signs will be reversed in the maximization case).
A formal and rigorous proof of the existence (and uniqueness) of a NEP for our game such that
it is non trivial or banal in the sense that it is never optimal for both the parties to switch or
when the switching control set reduce to a single switching/stopping time - is the big issue here.
In order to approach its solution , as we know from the introduction, one has in general two way:
analytic or probabilistic which are deeply interconnected (working in a markovian framework).
In particular, from the theory of BSDE with reflection11, we can state the next definition for
the stochastic representation of our Dynkin game of switching type as a system of interconnected
(non-linear) reflected BSDE. Let us denote first with
Mp = {E[sup
t≤T
|νt|p] <∞}
the set of progressively measurable and p integrable processes νt and with
Kp = {E[
∫ T
0
|νs|pds] <∞}
the set of continuous and progressively measurable processes. Hence the following states.
Definition 2.5.2 (RBSDE representation for game of switching type). Let us de-
fine the vector triple (Y i,Z , N i,Z ,Ki,Z) for i ∈ {A,B} and Z ∈ {z, ζ} with Y i and N i assumed
progressively measurable and adapted to the market filtration (FWt ) and K continuous and in-
creasing. Then, given the standard Brownian motion vector Wt, the terminal reward ξ
i, the
obstacles Y i,Zt − ci,Zt and the generator functions F iZ(., Y −i) assumed progressively measurable,
uniformly Lipschitz and interconnected between the players, the Dynkin game of switching type
formulated in (23) has the following representation through system of interconnected non-linear
reflected BSDE
Y A,z, Y A,ζ ∈ K2;NA,z, NA,ζ ∈M2; KA,z,KA,ζ ∈ K2, K non decreasing and K0 = 0,
Y A,Zt = ξ
A +
∫ T
s
FAZ (ys, u
A, NAs ;Y
B
s )ds−
∫ T
s
NA,Zs dWs +K
A,Z
T −KA,Zs , t ≤ s ≤ T ∧ τ, Z ∈ {z, ζ}
Y A,zt ≥ (Y A,ζt − cA,zt );
∫ T
0
[Y A,zt − (Y A,ζt − cA,zt )]dKA,zt = 0;
Y A,ζt ≥ (Y A,zt − cA,ζt );
∫ T
0
[Y A,ζt − (Y A,zt − cA,ζt )]dKA,ζt = 0;
Y B,z, Y B,ζ ∈ K2;NB,z, NB,ζ ∈M2; KB,z,KB,ζ ∈ K2, K non decreasing and K0 = 0,
Y B,Zt = ξ
B +
∫ T
s
FBZ (ys, u
B , NBs ;Y
A
s )ds−
∫ T
s
NB,Zs dWs +K
B,Z
T −KB,Zs , t ≤ s ≤ T ∧ τ , Z ∈ {z, ζ}
Y B,zt ≥ (Y B,ζt − cB,zt );
∫ T
0
[Y B,zt − (Y B,ζt − cB,zt )]dKB,zt = 0;
Y B,ζt ≥ (Y B,zt − cB,ζt );
∫ T
0
[Y B,ζt − (Y B,zt − cB,ζt )]dKB,ζt = 0
From definition 2.5.2, it is evident that the system of RBSDE is a non-standard one given
the characteristics of the generator functions (which are the cost function in our game) that are
inter-dependent and this is highlighted by the presence of the other player value process Y it inside
11We refer in particular to the classical work of El Karoui et al. (1997)
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F iZ(.) for i ∈ {A,B} . This makes hard to show the existence and uniqueness of the solution
of the system for the reason that we highlight below. In particular, the solution of this system
of RBSDE is made up of a two-dimensional vector made up by the triple (Y ∗,Z , N∗,Z ,K∗,Z)
where its dimension is given by the two switching regimes while the optimal switching sequences
is determined by the value process crossings of the barriers, represented by the last two lines of
the RBSDEs system.
Therefore, the other central issue is to show that the the system vector solution Y ∗,Z coincides
with the players value functions’ of the non-zero-sum game of switching type (23).
As far as we know, these issues have been tackled - in relation to switching problems - in the
already mentioned work of Hamadene and Zhang (2010). They study general system of m-
dimensional BSDE called with oblique reflection, which are RBSDE with both generator and
barrier interconnected as in our case, showing existence and uniqueness of the solution while the
optimal strategy in general does not exist but an approximating optimal strategy is constructed
(through some technical estimates).
Let us briefly recall the main technical assumptions that are imposed in order to derive these
results are:
• square integrability for both the generator function F i(.) and terminal reward ξ while the
obstacles function are continuous and bounded;
• Lipschitz (uniform) continuity of the generator function respect to its terms;
• both the generator and the obstacles are assumed to be increasing function of the other
players utility/value process.
As also mentioned in the above mentioned paper, the condition c) implies from a game point
of view that the players are partners, namely the interaction and the impact of the other players
value processes has a unique positive sign. This is not the case of our non-zero-sum game in
which the interaction allowed between the two players is antagonistic and more complicate.
Hence, as far as we know, the existence and uniqueness solution of the optimal switching strategy
for our game formulated in definition 2.5.2 is an open problem, whose solution needs further stud-
ies. Probably a solution for the problem exists but it won’t be unique, indeed the classifications
of solutions behavior’ and the conditions for their existence and uniqueness it is an interesting
and hard program to tackle analytically and also numerically. Therefore, even though one could
assume to simplify the problem in order to work under the same assumptions a)- c) that would
ensure the existence and uniqueness of the solution, it would remain to verify that the solution
of the system of RBSDE is the Nash equilibrium point for the game (23), which is complicated
by the fact that the optimal control strategy may not exist12. Formally, one should prove the
following theorem which is also an open problem.
Theorem 2.5.3 (NEP and RBSDE system solution). Let us assume the existence and
uniqueness of the solution for the system of definition 2.5.2, under the assumption a)- c). Then
the system RBSDE value processes Y ∗A, Y
∗
B coincide with the player value functions of the game
of switching type, that is
Y ∗A = J
A(y, u∗A, u
∗
B)
Y ∗B = J
B(y, u∗B , u
∗
A)
12See Hamadene and Zhang (2010) for details.
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and are such that condition (27) and (28) are satisfied, which implies the existence and unique-
ness of a Nash equilibrium point for the game (23).
Remarks 2.5.4. As we already know, in the markovian framework - thanks to El Karoui et
al. (1997) results - the solution of the system of RBSDE is connected with the viscosity solution
of a generalized system of non-linear PDE with generator and obstacles different and intercon-
nected between the two players, which is even harder to study analytically. The main alternative
is to try to approach numerically the problem, searching for the conditions under which one can
find the equilibrium. A possibility is to apply the same technique - Snell envelope and iterative
optimal stopping technique of the work of Carmona and Ludkovski (2010) 13. adapted to study
our stochastic game’s solution. In particular, the algorithm need to be generalized in order to
introduce the players’ strategic interaction and to compute the Nash equilibrium point of the
game.
Let us give here just a sketch of the numerical solution founded on the iterative optimal stopping
approach which is well suited to study the solution of our highly nonlinear and recursive prob-
lem. Let us pick for exposition convenience two calculation times t1 and t2 and a final regime
switching condition (given that the program run backward in time while the information grow
forward) thanks to the dynamic programming principle, both the players need to evaluate at
these discretized times
1. the optimality of an immediate switch at t1 to the other regime (Z ∈ {z, ζ}) taking in
account the best response function of the other player (over each switching time);
2. the optimality to continue namely to wait the next switching time t2, considering also in
this case the best response of the other party.
Formally, this means to run the following program:
V l,A(t1,Yt1 , uA, bB(uA)) = min
(
E
[ ∫ t2
t1
FA(s,Ys, uAs , bB(uAs ))ds+ V l,A(t2,Yt2 , uAt2 , bB(uAt2))|Ft1
]
,
SWA,Z(t1,Yt1 , uAt1 , bB(uAt1))
)
' min
(
FA,Z(t1,Yt1 , uAt1 , bB(uAt1))∆t+ E
[
V l,A(t2,Yt2 , uAt2 , bB(uAt2))|Ft1
]
,
{V l−1,A(t1,Yt1 , uAt1 , bB(uAt1))− cZt1}
)
(29)
V l,B(t1,Yt1 , uB , bA(uB)) = min
(
E
[ ∫ t2
t1
FB(s,Ys, uBs , bA(uBs ))ds+ V l,B(t2,Yt2 , uBt2 , bA(uBt2))|Ft1
]
,
SWB,Z(t1,Yt1 , uBt1 , bA(uBt1))
)
' min
(
FB,Z(t1,Yt1 , uBt1 , bA(uBt1))∆t+ E
[
V l,B(t2,Yt2 , uBt2 , bA(uBt2))|Ft1
]
,
{V l−1,B(t1,Yt1 , uBt1 , bA(uBt1))− cZt1}
)
(30)
where SW i,Z(.) is the so called intervention/switching operator that quantifies the switching
regime value and it represents the obstacle in our RBSDE’s formulation, while l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
13We refer also to the fifth section of Mottola (2013)
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denotes the number of switching time left.
By running the program (29)-(30) backward over time one needs to keep trace - over each
switching time - of both the players switching strategies - optimal or not - and the relative payoffs
in order to calculate in t = 0 the players value functions J i(.) and their game strategies (using
definition 2.4.3). Then by checking the conditions (27)-(28), the existence (and uniqueness) of
the Nash equilibrium point for the game (23) can be established. Definitely the equilibrium
existence needs a careful numerical analysis and algorithm implementation that we leave for a
future paper.
2.6 Game solution in a special case and further analysis
In this section we make some further reasoning on the game characteristics in order to possibly
simplify our general formulation (23) and to search for a solution. In particular, we focus the
analysis on the following three main points - already mentioned in the past section - that have
impact on the equilibrium characterization and existence:
a) information set between the players/counterparties;
b) rules of the game;
c) differences in the objective functionals of the players/counterparties.
a) Firstly, a careful analysis of the game information set is fundamental to characterize and
understand the game itself and its equilibrium. In our game formulation (23) we have assumed
symmetry in the information available for the players which helps to simplify the analysis, but
in general one needs to specify what is the information available to them at all the stage of the
game. Given that we have been working under the market filtration (Ft)t≥0, under symmetry
we get that both player knows ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] the values of the market variables and processes that
enter the valuation problem, namely
FAt = FBt = Ft ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
So, both players are able to calculate the outcomes/payoff of the game through time. This implies
that the players know each other cost functions so that the game is said information complete14
and it is easier to solve for a NEP knowing the best response function.
It is important to underline that the game is played simultaneously at the decision times but it
is dynamic and recursive because of the optimal strategy played today will depend not only on
the initial condition (that is usually common knowledge) but on future decisions taken by both
the players. Clearly, this complicates game characteristics of the game imposing a backward
induction procedure to search for an equilibrium point.
Of course, the assumption to know the counterparty cost function is quite strong for our problem
in which the parties of the underlying contract can operate in completely different markets or
industries, but it can be not uncommon to verify a cooperative behavior between them. In
particular, in cooperative games the players aim to maximize or minimize the sum of the values
14They know strategies and payoff at every stage of the game.
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of their payoff over times, namely
Jcoop(y, u∗) := inf
u∗∈{CAad∪CBad}
[
JA(y, uA) + JB(y, uB)
]
:= inf
u∗∈{CAad∪CBad}
E
[∑
j
∫ τ ij∧τ−ij ∧T
t
Bs
[
FA(ys, u
A, bB(uA)) +
+ FB(ys, u
B , bA(uB))
]
ds+
(
lA(τAj z
A
j ) + l
B(τBj , z
B
j )
)]
+
(
GA(y(T ), bB(uA)) +GB(y(T ), bA(uB))
)∣∣∣∣Ft
]
for j = 1, . . . ,M.
This type of equilibrium, depending on the type of game considered, is much more difficult
to study in the stochastic framework, given the necessity to find the condition under which play-
ers cooperate over time and have no incentives ”to cheat” playing a different (non cooperative)
strategy. This can be an interesting further generalization for our game model that would be
important to examine in major depth. Hence this is an other interesting topic to study in relation
to our type of game that would be important to examine this issue in major depth.
b) Also the rules of the game are important in order to simplify the search for the equilibrium.
In our model both the counterparties are able to switch optimally every time over the contract
life. Discretizing the time domain, we have been lead to think at the game as played simultane-
ously through time over the switching time set that can be predefined in the contract or model
specific. In terms of game theory, this means that a given decisional node of the game the play-
ers make their optimal choice based on the information available (which is common knowledge)
at that node and at the subsequent node they observe the outcome of the last interaction and
update their strategy.
An other possibility that may help to simplify things, is to assume that - by contract specifica-
tions - the counterparties can switch only at predefined times and that the two sets have null
intersection, namely {
τAj ∩ τBj
}M
j=1
= ∅.
This happen for example if the right to switch is set as ”sequential”. So, again in terms of
game theory, the strategic interaction and the game become sequential : under the assumption
of incomplete information, this type of games are generally solved via backward induction pro-
cedure and one can search for a weaker type of Nash equilibrium. Clearly, we remind that in our
case this type of equilibrium need to be studied under a stochastic framework which remains a
cumbersome and tough task both analytically and numerically
Clearly, we remind that this type of equilibrium should be studied under a stochastic framework
which is analytically more difficult and also numerically it can be a cumbersome task. A strategic
sequential interaction like that, can be also obtained by setting time rules like the so called grace
periods within the contract CSA, namely a time delta ∆t that the other party has to wait - after
a switching time - before making its optimal switching decision.
c) The last point really relevant in our game analysis concerns the relative differences between
counterparties objective functionals. In particular, recalling our model specifications, the main
variables that have impact in this sense are:
• differences in the default intensities processes λAt , λBt ;
20
• differences in the cost function thresholds δA(.), δB(.);
• differences in funding/opportunity costs RAt (.), RBt (.);
• differences in the (instantaneous) switching costs cz,At (.), ,cz,Bt (.).
To be more clear, let us focus on some specific case.
1) Symmetric case. Let us simplify things by considering the special case of our game
(23) in which symmetry between the party of the contract is assumed. In this special case, we
are able to show the existence of the solution for the game and we also highlight the impact
on the equilibrium of just a simple constant threshold δ in the running cost functions. Under
symmetry, it is easy to show that the game solution coincides with that of a stochastic control
problem of switching type. In fact, solving the control problem from just one player’s perspective
is equivalent to a game played by symmetric players with objective functional having the same
parameters. In economic terms, the reason to consider a game between two symmetric players
can be justified if one thinks to two institutions with similar business characteristics other than
risk worthiness, that operate in the same country/region/market with the objective to optimally
manage the counterparty risk and the collateral and funding costs by signing a contingent CSA in
which are defined all the relevant parameters necessary to know each other objective functional.
Hence, let us be more formal and let’s consider a game played under these special symmetric
conditions, it is not difficult to see that the game payoffs will be the same for both the player: in
fact, being δA(.) = δB(.) = 0, the square of BCVA and collateral costs functions is the same and
also the instantaneous costs are assumed equal. This implies that also the best response functions
will be equal for both the player, namely they play the same switching strategy, however the
game is played simultaneously or sequentially. So, on the basis of this chain of thought, and
imposing the following technical conditions15
Hp1) the stochastic factors that drive the dynamic of the system (Xt)0≤t≤T and (λt)0≤t≤T , (that
we indicate with the vector Yt for brevity) are R-valued processes adapted to the market
filtration Fx,λt = σ{W x,λs , s ≤ t}t∈[0,T ] assumed right-continuous and complete;
Hp2) the cost functions F iZ(.) ∈ Mp and GiZ(.) ∈ Mp while the switching costs liZ(.)Z ∈ Kp,
being deterministic and continuous;
Hp3) the running costs functions need to satisfy the linear growth condition and for the switching
costs ciZ a technical condition as min{ciz, ciζ} ≥ C for i ∈ {A,B} t ≤ T ∧ τ , switching
indicators {z, ζ} ∈ Z and real constant C > 0, is imposed in order to reduce the convenience
to switch too many times;
the following result states.
Proposition 2.6.1 (NEP Existence and uniqueness in symmetric case.). Assume
symmetric conditions for our Dynkin game of switching type (23), taking relations (24-26) with
the equality and set δA(.) = δB(.) = 0. In addition, under the technical (Hp1 -Hp3) exists and is
unique a Nash equilibrium for this game and it coincides with the value function of the following
stochastic control problem16 that is
J(y, u) = inf
u∈{Cad}
E
[∑
j
∫ τj∧T
t
Bs
[
FZ(ys, u)
]
ds+
∑
j≥1
czj (t)1{τj<T} +G(yT )
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(31)
15We refer here to section 2.1 of Djehiche et al. (2008).
16The problem is explicitly set in Mottola (2013).
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where the model dynamics dYt has been defined in section 2.3 and the following relation for the
value function states
JA(y, u∗A;u
∗
B) = J
B(y, u∗A;u
∗
B) = V
∗(y, u∗). (32)
which indicates the irrelevance of the strategic interaction under symmetry.
Proof. The proof is easy given the above reasonings. In fact, under the symmetry conditions
and recalling the notation from the general game formulation (23) we have that the following
relations hold:
FAZ (ys, u
A, bB(uA)) = FBZ (ys, u
B , bA(uB))
lAzAj
(t)1{τAj ∧τBj <T} = l
B
zBj
(t)1{τBj ∧τAj <T}
GA(y(T ), bB(uA)) = GB(y(T ), bA(uB))
and being control sequence optimal for both players we can set τj := τ
A
j = τ
B
j which implies
1{τAj ∧τBj <T} = 1{τj<T}, namely u
∗
A = u
∗
B , which implies also the equality of the best response
functions bA(uB) = bB(uA) = 0, given the assumptions on the thresholds δi(.). This means also
that the strategic interaction becomes irrelevant and the game solution can be reduced to that
of an optimal switching control problem equivalent for both the players, so that game (23) is
reduced to the problem (31), namely
J(y, u) := JA(y, uA, uB) = JB(y, uB , uA) =⇒
J(y, u) = inf
u∈{Cad}
E
[∑
j
∫ τj∧T
t
Bs
[
FZ(ys, u)
]
ds+
∑
j≥1
czj (t)1{τj<T} +G(yT )
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
By the proof of value function’s existence and uniqueness V ∗(y, u∗) for this problem (for which
we refer to Djehiche et al. (2008)), one derives the optimal sequence of switching times and indi-
cators u∗ = {T ∗,Z∗}. that satisfies conditions (27) and (28) of NEP definition 2.5.1, being the
control strategy optimal for both players (by symmetry). Indeed, given that the two problems
representation are actually the same, the NEP exists and is unique - from the existence and
uniqueness of the value V ∗(y;u∗) - and equation (32) is true, as we wanted to show. 
2) Case δA = δB 6= 0. In general with different function parametrization between players
and incomplete or asymmetric information, the equilibrium is much harder to find and different
strategies has to be checked. To give an idea of this, let us consider just a slight modification
of the symmetric case conditions, setting for example the cost functions threshold δA = δB > 0,
and keeping the information incomplete and the game play simultaneous. By the symmetry of
BCVA and (running) collateral/funding costs, we know that a positive value of one term for A, is
negative for B and viceversa. So introducing the threshold create different payoffs for the player,
as we can easily see below
(BCV AA − δ)2 ≷ (BCV AB − δ)2
given that if BCV AAt > 0 then BCV A
B
t < 0 and viceversa
17. So, even though they knew each
other objective functional, there would be some paths and periods in which the strategic behav-
ior of the players is in contrast, say of war type and others of peace type (as by pure strategy
definition 2.4.3), making the analysis more complicate.
17This is true also for the other switching costs related to collateral and funding. Of course one should consider
also the weight of the expected payoff value from keeping the strategy for an other period.
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3) Game banal solution case. Worth of mention the possibility that the game is not
played, namely it reveals to be never optimal to switch for both the players. It’s relevant to
study the conditions under this kind of behavior of the solution come up, given that the scheme
would lose its economic sense. This singular game solution can come up if we formulate to our
simultaneous game as a zero sum game. This can happen by considering - for example - linear
objective functionals with threshold δ ≈ 0, in fact - by symmetry of the BCVA and of funding
cost function - a positive outcome for one player is negative for the counterpart18. Assuming
instantaneous switching costs cz > 0 for both players and - to simplify - that both know each
other cost functions, we get that this game will never be played. The reason is that by the game
zero sum structure, the optimal strategy for one is not optimal for the other, so every switch will
be followed by the opposite switch at every switching time, like the sequence{
z1 = 1, z2 = 0, z3 = 1, . . . , zM = 1
}
But by rationality and taking in account the positive cost of switching, one can conclude that
the game will never be played by a rational agent.
So, let us summarize this last logic chain of thoughts in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6.2 (Game banal solution in the zero-sum case). Let us assume that
game (23) be a zero-sum game with linear functionals set for both the counterparties. Assuming
in addition the same funding costs for both players, δ ≈ 0 and positive switching costs cz > 0
(for both), then the optimal strategy is to never play this game (that is a banal solution of the
game).
We end the section by remarking the importance of the points highlighted in the construction
of some kind of equilibrium for a Dynkin game of switching type as our one. Although mainly
theoretical, the existence of the equilibrium and the derivation of the conditions under which a
non banal solution exists, are relevant economically and in the contract design phase.
Hence, the main task to pursue in future research are a rigorous proof of the existence and of
the equilibrium for this type of game, and the definition of an efficient algorithm to check the
model solutions.
3 Applications and further researches
Switching type mechanisms like the one we have analyzed can find different applications into
the wild world of finance. The basic underlying idea is to ensure flexibility to agents’ invest-
ments decisions over time which is a usual objective in real option theory. Our problem has
been thought mainly in a risk management view but with the development of new techniques
and algorithms, also the related pricing problem will be tackled efficiently and more financial
contract would find useful and convenient - in a optimal risk management view - this type of
contingent mechanisms. As regards just a possible further application in risk management, it
would be important to deepen the analysis of a switching type collateralization from a portfolio
perspective, taking for example the view of a central clearing. In particular, it would be relevant
to show possibly analytically but mainly with numerical examples, the greater convenience of the
switching/contingent solution respect to a non contingent/standard collateral agreement like the
partial or full one, including clauses like, early termination, netting and others. This is an hard
program, which needs a generalized model formulation in order to include all the CSA clauses
18Obviously, when the value of the cost functions compensate each other, no switch take place
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and in order to deal with the high recursion that characterizes the problem.
In a pricing view, we remind the example - of the fixed income market - some particular bonds
called flippable or switchable, that are characterized by options to switch the coupon from fix to
floating rate. Clearly, in this case the valuation is easier given that this securities have a market
and are not traded OTC so one does not need to include in the picture counterparty risk, fund-
ing and CSA cash ows. Anyway, it would be interesting to delve into the valuation of an OTC
contract in witch also the dividend flows can be subject to contingent switching mechanism. As
regards similar case, a problem that can be very interesting and difficult to tackle is the valuation
of a flexi swap in presence of a contingent collateralization like our one.
The main characteristics of a flexi-swap are:
a) the notional of the flexible swap at period n must lie (inclusively) between predefined bounds
Ln and Un;
b) the notional of the flexible swap at period n must be less than or equal to the notional at the
previous period n− 1;
c) The party paying fixed has the option at the start of each period n to choose the notional,
subject to the two conditions above.
In other words, we deal with a swap with multiple embedded option that allows one party to
change the notional under certain constraints defined in the contract. This kind of interest rate
swaps are usually used as hedging instruments of other swaps having notional linked to loans,
especially mortgages.19 The underlying idea is that the fixed-rate payer (the option holder) will
amortize as much as allowed if interest rates are very low, and will amortize as little as allowed
if interest rates are very high.
Given a payment term structure {Tn}Nn=0 and a set of coupons Xn (with unit notional) fixing in
Tn e paying in Tn+1 (n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1), the flexi swap is a fixed vs floating swap where the
fixed payer has to pay a net coupon XnRn in Tn+1, the notional R0 is fixed upfront at inception
and for every Tn, Rn can be amortized if it respects some given constraints defined as follows:
1. deterministic constraints : Rn ∈ [glown , ghighn ];
2. local constraints function of the current notional: Rn ∈ [llown (Rn−1)lhighn (Rn−1)];
3. market constraints (libor, swap denoted with Xn): Rn ∈ [mlown (Xn),mhighn (Xn)].
The valuation procedure of this type of swap involves a backward recursion keeping track of the
notional in every payment date. But introducing also the switching collateralization, the valu-
ation become an ”intricate puzzle” given the recursive relation between the optimal switching
strategy, the price process of the claim which in addition depends on the optimal notional choice
over time. Simplifying modeling assumptions are needed to break the curse of recursion in a
defaultable OTC contract like this.
4 Conclusions
In this work, we have generalized the contingent CSA scheme defined in our preceding work to
the bilateral case allowing the strategic interaction between the counterparties of a defaultable
(OTC) contract. The problem in this case has a natural formulation as a stochastic differential
game - a generalized Dynkin game - of switching type, for which - as far as we know - no analytical
solution for a Nash equilibrium point is known.
19 In this sense is like there were a third reference represented by the pool of loans.
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We have shown, in particular, that the game solution is strictly related to that of a system of
reflected BSDE with interconnected barriers and generator functions. Only by imposing strong
assumptions and simplifications we are able to prove the game solution, in the so called symmetric
case. Further research are needed and addressed in the end in the field of stochastic games and
RBSDE and some interesting applications in finance are highlighted in order to show also the
importance in practice of our mainly theoretical problem.
References
Bensoussan, A., and A. Friedman, Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games With Stopping
Times and Free Boundary Problems, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society,
1977.
Bielecki, T. R., Cialenko, I. and Iyigunler, I., Counterparty Risk and the Impact of Collateral-
ization in CDS Contracts. available at arxiv.org, 2011.
Bielecki, T. R. and Rutkowski, M., Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games With Stopping
Times and Free Boundary Problems, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society,
1977.
D. Brigo, Capponi, A., Pallavicini A. and Papatheodorou, V., Collateral Margining in Arbitrage-
Free Counterparty Valuation Adjustment including Re-Hypotecation and Netting, available at
arxiv.org, pages 1-39, 2011.
Brigo, D., Pallavicini, D. Parini, Funding Valuation Adjustment:a consistent framework in-
cluding CVA, DVA, collateral,netting rules and re-hypothecation, 2011. Available online at
www.Arxiv.org.
Carmona, R. and Ludkovski, M. (2010) Valuation of Energy Storage: An Optimal Switching
Approach, Quantitative finance, 10(4), 359-374.
Cesari, G., Aquilina J., et al., Modelling pricing and hedging counterparty credit exposure,
Springer Finance, Springer-Verlag, First edition. 2010.
Cvitanic J. and Karatzas I., Backward stochastic differential equations with reflection and Dynkin
games, The Annals of probability, 1996.
B. Djehiche, S. Hamadene and A. Popier, A Finite Horizon Optimal Multiple Switching Problem,
Siam Journal Control Optimization, 48(4), 2751-2770, 2008.
Dynkin, E. B., Game variant of a problem on optimal stopping. Soviet Math. Dokl, 10, pp
270-274. 1967.
El Karoui, N., and Hamadene S., BSDEs and Risk-Sensitive Control,Zero-Sum and Nonzero-Sum
Game Problems of Stochastic Functional Differential Equations, Stochastic Processes and their
Applications, 2003.
El Karoui N., Kapoudjian, C., Pardoux, E., Peng, S. and Quenez, M. C., Reflected solutions of
backward SDE’s and related obstacle problems for PDE’s, The Annals of probability, 1997.
Fleming, Soner, Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions, Springer Verlag, 2008
Fleming, Souganidis, On the existence of value functions of two player, zero-sum stochastic
differential games, Indiana Univ. Math. J., 1989
25
Hamadene, S., Backward-forward SDEs and Stochastic Differential Games. Stochastic Processes
and their Applications. 1998.
Hamadene, S., Lepeltier, J-P., (2000). Reflected BSDEs and Mixed Game Problem, Stochastic
Processes and their Applications. 2000.
Hamadene, S. and Zhang, J., The Continuous Time Nonzero-sum Dynkin Game Problem and
Application in Game Options, ArXiv, pages 1-16, 2008.
Hamadene, S. and Zhang, J., Switching problem and relates system of reflected backward SDEs.
Stochastic processes and their applications, 2010.
Isaacs, R., Differential games, Dover Books on Mathematics. Revised edition, 1999.
Kifer, Y., Game options, Finance and Stochastics. 2000.
Mottola, G. (2013), Switching type valuation and design problems in general OTC contracts with
CVA, collateral and funding issue. PhD Thesis, School of Economics, Sapienza University of
Rome
Nash, J. F., Equilibrium Points in N-person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 1950.
Neumann, von J., Morgenstern, O., Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton Press,
1944.
Pham, H., Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with Financial Applications,
Springer Verlag. 2009.
Yong, J. and Zhu, X. Y., Stochastic controls. Hamiltonian systems and HJB equations, Springer-
Verlag. 1999
26
